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Statutory Cosmetic Surgery: Misinterpretation of the
Copyright Act’s Registration Requirement in Cosmetic
Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp
I. INTRODUCTION
In the era of Internet-at-your-fingertips, cars can be registered
within minutes online. Instead of mailing registration cards, new
electronic products can be registered instantaneously through the
Internet. University students can even register for classes at the mere
click of a mouse. With such convenience, most people never consider
at what point “registration” occurs—that is, whether cars, electronic
products, and students are registered when the online forms are
electronically submitted or when, milliseconds later, the servers
respond by accepting the registration.
However, in the context of copyright registration, this
distinction matters. The Copyright Act permits copyright holders to
initiate actions for infringement only after the copyright has been
“registered” by the Copyright Office.1 Because the time between
submitting an application and having the application acted on by the
Copyright Office often runs more than six months,2 as opposed to
the milliseconds in many other registration contexts, it is important
for potential plaintiffs to know whether they can bring suit after
submitting the application materials, or whether they must wait for
the Copyright Office to act. Unfortunately, for some plaintiffs,
waiting the more than six months for the Copyright Office to act
places them beyond the statute of limitations, thus removing any
possibility of recovering for infringement.
In Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp,3 the Ninth
Circuit addressed this very issue, which had already split circuit and
district courts across the country. The court, by looking at not only
the plain language of the Copyright Act but also the legislative
purpose and broader context of the statute, held that the plaintiff’s
copyright was “registered” at the time it submitted an application to
1. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006).
2. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-what.html#
certificate (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
3. 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010).
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the Copyright Office, thus allowing the case to proceed on the
merits. This Note disagrees with the Ninth Circuit, instead arguing
that it was unnecessary for the court to analyze legislative purpose
and the broader context of the statute because the plain language is
clear that the Copyright Office must act on an application before it is
registered. Thus, the court should have dismissed the claim because
it was brought before the copyright was registered.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II details the facts and
procedural history of Cosmetic Ideas. Before analyzing the court’s
opinion in Part IV, Part III outlines the legal background—
including the current circuit split—leading up to the court’s
decision. Part V then analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
concluding that the court made significant errors in statutory
construction in holding that a copyright is registered at the time the
application is received by the Copyright Office. Part VI briefly
concludes.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This dispute arose between two jewelry retailers: Cosmetic Ideas,
Inc., doing business as Sweet Romance Jewelry Manufacturing
(“Cosmetic”), and IAC/InterActiveCorp, the parent company of the
ubiquitous Home Shopping Network (“HSN”). Cosmetic
manufactures and retails costume jewelry designed by artist and
historian Shelley B. Cooper and inspired by antique and vintage
items.4 It sells its products through a variety of high-end jewelry
retailers, such as Hearst Castle, Canterbury Cathedral, and Fortnum
and Mason, as well as on its own website.5 HSN is a 24-hour-a-day
basic cable shopping network reaching over 90 million homes and
selling a broad range of products, including clothing, exercise
equipment, food and cooking devices, and of course, jewelry.6
In 1997, Cosmetic designed a piece of costume jewelry called
the “Lady Caroline Lorgnette,” a pendant featuring an acrylic
magnifying glass adorned with crystals to simulate jewels.7 Two years
later, Cosmetic began to manufacture and sell copies of the Lady
4. SWEET ROMANCE JEWELRY, http://www.sweetromanceonline.com/AboutUs.asp
(last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
5. See id.
6. See
HSN,
INC.,
http://www.hsni.com/?o=!BNCI0&cm_sp=Global*BN*
CompanyInfo (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
7. See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 614.
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Caroline Lorgnette through its distributors.8 Cosmetic claims that
sometime between 2005 and 2008, HSN began “manufacturing and
distributing copies of a ‘virtually identical’ necklace” to the Lady
Caroline Lorgnette.9
It was not until March 6, 2008 that Cosmetic submitted to the
Copyright Office an application for registration of its copyright in
the necklace, receiving confirmation of receipt of the application on
March 12, 2008.10 On March 27, 2008, Cosmetic filed a complaint
in the Central District of California for copyright infringement,
alleging that HSN infringed Cosmetic’s copyright in the necklace by
selling necklaces that were virtually identical.11 The Copyright Office
eventually issued a certificate of registration, but not until sometime
after Cosmetic had filed the complaint against HSN.12
On June 2, 2008, HSN filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the court lacked such
jurisdiction over the controversy because Cosmetic had not
registered the copyright, as required by the Copyright Act, when it
commenced the action in district court.13 The district court granted
HSN’s motion on June 17, 2008, resulting in this appeal to the
Ninth Circuit.14
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
Under the power granted it by the Copyright Clause to regulate
copyright protection,15 Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976
(“the Act”) to “adopt[] a single system of federal statutory
copyright.”16 This system replaced an “anachronistic, uncertain,
impractical, and highly complicated dual system” that provided
common law copyrights for unpublished works and Federal statutory
copyrights for published works.17 Under this simplified federal

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
5745.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
Id.
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system, copyright protection begins the moment an original work of
authorship is “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”18 Thus,
registration of a copyright is not necessary to obtain protection.19
Nevertheless, to encourage copyright registration and thus a
“robust federal register,”20 Congress predicated the ability to bring
suit for copyright infringement on the work first being registered.21
Accordingly, § 411(a) of the Act provides, “[N]o action for
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be
instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been made
in accordance with this title.”22 In order to avoid the technicalities of
previous copyright statutes, however, registration is “a relatively
simple . . . process,”23 requiring only deposit of two copies of the
work,24 an application for registration,25 and payment of a fee.26
Courts, though, are split over what it means for copyright
registration to have “been made” under § 411(a)—in other words,
when a copyright is “registered.” Some courts hold, under the
“application approach,” that a copyright is “registered” when all
necessary materials are submitted to the Copyright Office.27 Other
courts, under the “registration approach,” disagree and require the
Copyright Office to have acted on the application—which can often
take more than six months—before a party can institute an action for
copyright infringement.28
This debate first arose because many courts treated § 411(a)’s
registration requirement as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. For

18. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). Under previous copyright statutes, copyright protection
was dependent on formalities such as notice, deposit, and registration. H.R. REP. NO. 941476, at 147–50 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5763–66.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (“Such registration is not a condition of copyright
protection.”).
20. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2010).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
22. Id.
23. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1199 (10th
Cir. 2005), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 408(b).
25. Id. § 409.
26. Id. § 708.
27. E.g., Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003);
Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386–87 (5th Cir. 1984).
28. E.g., La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1202–03; M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron
Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1489 (11th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at
1243.
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example, the Tenth Circuit in La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay
Realtors Angel Fire29 endorsed the registration approach, upholding
the dismissal of a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
it was filed before the Copyright Office acted on the plaintiff’s
application for registration.30 The Supreme Court in Reed Elsevier,
Inc. v. Muchnick,31 however, abrogated this and other cases, holding
that although the “registration requirement is a precondition to
filing a claim,” it “does not restrict a federal court’s subject matter
jurisdiction.”32
Although post-Reed Elsevier the registration requirement is not a
jurisdictional bar, it remains part of an infringement claim. Thus, the
debate between the application and registration approaches
continues as courts must determine whether a plaintiff has satisfied
all elements of an infringement claim when she has applied for
registration but the Copyright Office has yet to act on the
application. It is precisely this question that the Ninth Circuit faced
in Cosmetic Ideas.
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
In Cosmetic Ideas, the Ninth Circuit adopted the application
approach and held that a copyrighted work is registered at the time
the copyright holder’s application is received by the Copyright
Office.33 To reach this conclusion, the court performed standard
statutory interpretation techniques, beginning by analyzing the plain
language of the statute, then looking at the language of the statute
as a whole and concluding by considering the broader context and
the purpose of the statute (including analyzing its legislative
history).34
Before addressing the merits of the arguments, the court began
by noting that the Copyright Office had acted on Cosmetic’s
application for registration and issued a certificate of registration for
the contested necklace.35 Once a copyright is accepted for
registration, the registration dates back to the day on which the
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1208.
130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
Id. at 1241.
Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 616–18.
Id. at 616.
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application, fee, and deposit are first made to the Copyright Office.36
Thus, the issue of registration as a precondition to suit was moot
because the controversy had ended. Nevertheless, the Court decided
to address the issue because it was one “capable of repetition yet
evading review.”37 Furthermore, the law across the country was
murky and unsettled, and the Ninth Circuit wanted to weigh in.38
The court began its statutory analysis by reviewing “the plain
language of the statute.”39 As mentioned previously, the Copyright
Act provides, inter alia: “[N]o action for infringement of the
copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until
preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made
in accordance with this title.”40 However, the court found that the
Act’s definition of “registration” was wholly unhelpful in
interpreting the term.41
Because the language of the statute was unhelpful in interpreting
the term “registration,” the court continued by dissecting “the
language of the statute as a whole to determine the intended
meaning.”42 According to the court, “copyright registration is
addressed in five consecutive sections: §§ 408 through 412.”43 The
court conceded that two subsections, “§ 410(a) and portions of
411(a), contain language that suggests that registration requires
some affirmative steps to be taken by the Copyright Office.”44 For
example, § 410(a) “places an active burden of examination and
registration upon the Register, suggesting that registration is not
accomplished by application alone.”45
The court went on, though, to argue that “[o]ther sections of
the Act . . . cast doubt on this interpretation.”46 For example, § 408
“favors the application approach,” stating that a copyright owner
“may obtain registration . . . by delivering to the Copyright Office”
36. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2006).
37. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616 (internal quotations omitted).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
41. Id. § 101 (“‘Registration’ . . . means a registration of a claim in the original or the
renewed and extended term of copyright.”); Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616.
42. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616.
43. Id. at 617.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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an application.47 Additionally, § 411(a) favors the application
approach because it permits a plaintiff to bring suit for infringement
after it receives a rejection from the Copyright Office, so long as it
serves notice on the Register of Copyrights.48 Other sections, such as
§ 410(d), however, “could be read as supporting either the
application or registration approach.”49 Thus, the court was “not
persuaded that the plain language of the Act [as a whole]
unequivocally support[ed] either the registration or application
approach.”50 This ambiguity made it necessary to look beyond the
plain language of the statute “to determine which approach better
carrie[d] out the purpose of the statute.”51
After looking to “‘the broader context of the statute as a whole’
and the purpose of the statute,”52 the Ninth Circuit ultimately
concluded that “the application approach better fulfill[ed]
Congress’s purpose of providing broad copyright protection while
maintaining a robust federal register.”53 In coming to this
conclusion, the court emphasized three policy reasons. “First, the
application approach avoids unnecessary delay in copyright
infringement litigation, which could permit an infringing party to
continue to profit from its wrongful acts.”54 Second, “the application
approach avoids delay without impairing the central goal of
copyright registration,” that of maintaining a robust federal
register.55 Last, in addition to inefficiency, the registration approach,
in the “worst-case scenario,” is unfair because it causes a party to
completely lose its ability to recover for infringement.56
Above all, the court emphasized that the application approach
“‘best effectuate[s] the interests of justice and promote[s] judicial
economy.’”57 Because a copyright holder could ultimately bring a

47. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
49. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting United States v. Olander, 572 F.3d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotations omitted)).
53. Id. at 619.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 620.
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Int’l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass’n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81
F. Supp. 2d 70, 72 (D.D.C. 2000)).
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suit for infringement regardless of whether the application is
approved or rejected, it was a “needless formality” to have to wait
until receiving notice of approval before initiating suit.58 Thus,
because Cosmetic had satisfied the registration requirement by
submitting a completed application to the Copyright Office a
number of weeks before filing its complaint, § 411(a) did not bar its
infringement claim.59 The case was to proceed on the merits.60
V. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Cosmetic Ideas misinterpreted the
plain language of the statute. A proper reading reveals that a
copyright holder satisfies § 411(a)’s registration requirement—thus
allowing her to bring an infringement claim—at the time that her
application for registration is acted on by the Copyright Office, not
merely when it is received. In coming to the opposite conclusion, the
Ninth Circuit created a “topsy-turvy”61 statutory scheme. Moreover,
because the statute’s plain language is not ambiguous, the court
erred by considering its purpose and broader context. Only the
registration approach properly harmonizes all statutory language
referring to registration, thereby creating a “coherent and
consistent” statutory scheme.62
A. The Plain Language of the Act
Any exercise in statutory construction begins by analyzing the
plain language of the statute.63 Section 411(a) provides, “[N]o
action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work
shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has
been made in accordance with this title.”64 Admittedly, this provision

58. Id.
59. Id. at 620–22.
60. Id. at 622.
61. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1204 (10th
Cir. 2005), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
62. Id. at 1200 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)) (“If
the statutory language is not ambiguous, and the ‘statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,’
our inquiry ends.”).
63. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616 (citing K&N Eng’g, Inc. v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079,
1081 (9th Cir. 2007)).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006).
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alone provides little guidance on what constitutes “registration” or at
what point a copyright is “registered.”65 However,
[s]tatutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that
may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder
of the statutory scheme—because the same terminology is used
elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear, or because only
one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that
is compatible with the rest of the law.66

Such is the case with the registration requirement. When read in
conjunction with other statutory provisions addressing copyright
registration,67 it becomes clear that registration is made under
§ 411(a) when the Copyright Office approves the application.
Furthermore, only this interpretation “produces a substantive effect
that is compatible with the rest of the law”68—that is, only the
registration approach creates a coherent statutory scheme where each
provision is operative and terms are given consistent meanings
throughout.
The court in Cosmetic Ideas, however, did not properly consider
the statutory scheme as a whole. First, in concluding “that the plain
language of the Act [does not] unequivocally support[] either the
registration or application approach,”69 the court misinterpreted
statutory language clearly indicating that it is the Copyright Office,
not the copyright holder, that registers a copyright. Second, by
adopting the application approach, it interpreted the Act in a way
that failed to give effect to every statutory provision and created an
inconsistent statutory scheme.
1. It is the Register of Copyrights and not the applicant that registers a
copyright
The court erred in concluding that the statute “suggests
registration is accomplished by completing the process of submitting
an application”70 because the Act makes it clear that it is the Register

65. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616–17.
66. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988) (internal citation omitted).
67. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 408–12.
68. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. at 371.
69. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618.
70. Id.
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of Copyrights, not the applicant, that actually registers a copyright.71
The court focused its analysis on determining what it means to
“register” a copyrighted work and when a copyrighted work is
“registered.”72 It is more pertinent, however, to approach the issue
by looking at who “registers”73 or “makes registration”74 of a
copyright. Under this approach, because the statutory scheme
confers the power to register a copyright exclusively on the
Copyright Office, registration cannot be “made” under § 411(a) by
an applicant’s actions alone.
Section 410 provides the primary support for this interpretation
of § 411(a):
When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines
that, in accordance with the provisions of this title, the material
deposited constitutes copyrightable subject matter and that the
other legal and formal requirements of this title have been met, the
Register shall register the claim and issue to the applicant a
certificate of registration under the seal of the Copyright Office.75

The court conceded that § 410 “suggest[s] that registration is
not accomplished by application alone”;76 however, this concession is
insufficient. This statute does more than merely suggest that an
application is insufficient for registration; it clearly and unequivocally
places the sole power of registering copyrights on the Copyright
Office. Because the Register is the one to register the copyright after
examination, it follows that a copyright is not automatically
registered upon an applicant’s unilateral action of submitting an
application.77
The court argued, however, that “[o]ther sections of the Act . . .
cast doubt on this interpretation,” and thus the Act as a whole is

71. Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting Ryan v.
Carl Corp., No. C 97-3873, 1998 WL 320817, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 1998)).
72. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2006).
74. Id. § 411(a) (permitting an infringement action to be instituted when
“registration . . . has been made”).
75. Id. § 410(a) (emphasis added).
76. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617.
77. Section 410(d) contains similar language: “The effective date of a copyright
registration is the day on which an application, deposit, and fee, which are later determined by
the Register of Copyrights . . . to be acceptable for registration, have all been received in the
Copyright Office.” 17 U.S.C. § 410(d).
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ambiguous.78 Perhaps its strongest argument as to the ambiguity of
the plain language was § 408(a).79 Section 408(a) provides, “[T]he
owner of copyright . . . may obtain registration of the copyright
claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by
this section, together with the application and fee . . . .”80 The Ninth
Circuit argued that this provision “favors the application approach”81
because it “implies that the sole requirement for obtaining
registration is delivery of the appropriate documents and fee.”82 This
is not the case, however. Upon closer analysis, both the language of
this section and the inferences that can be drawn from the language
Congress did not use are consistent with the registration approach
and confirm that third party action is required to register a
copyright.
First, because § 408(a) contains the language “may obtain”
instead of “shall obtain,” “[it] envisions substantive review of the
material by the Register of Copyrights.”83 In statutory construction,
the word “may” is generally a permissive term, as opposed to the
mandatory term “shall.”84 For example, one court interpreted the
phrase “each consumer who prevails may obtain . . . an order
enjoining such acts or failure to act” to mean that it was within the
discretion of the trial court to grant or deny injunctive relief.85
Likewise, the phrase “may obtain registration . . . by delivering to
the Copyright Office”86 implies that a copyright is not registered
automatically upon submission but that registration is dependent on
the discretion of the Copyright Office.87 This conclusion is bolstered

78. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617.
79. Id.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (emphasis added).
81. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617.
82. Id.
83. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th
Cir. 2005), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010); Corbis
Corp. v. UGO Networks, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 520, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
84. Bennett v. Pan. Canal Co., 475 F.2d 1280, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also United
States v. Rogers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983) (“The word ‘may,’ when used in a statute, usually
implies some degree of discretion. This common-sense principle of statutory construction is by
no means invariable, however, . . . and can be defeated by indications of legislative intent to
the contrary or by obvious inferences from the structure and purpose of the statute . . . .”).
85. David McDavid Pontiac, Inc. v. Nix, 681 S.W.2d 831, 839 (Tex. App. 1984)
(emphasis added).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
87. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1201.
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by the fact that in other portions of the Act Congress used the word
“shall,”88 thus underscoring the fact that the terms “shall” and
“may” have different meanings within this statutory scheme.89
Second, Congress’s use of the phrase “obtain registration”
instead of “register” in § 408(a) indicates that it did not intend the
applicant to be the one to register copyrights. In the Act, the only
time that Congress used the word “register” was in reference to the
Register of Copyrights in § 410.90 Generally, where Congress uses
specific language in one section but chooses to use different
language in another section of the same Act, the meaning of the first
language should not be read into the second.91 Accordingly, because
Congress could have replaced the phrase “obtain registration” with
the word “register,” “obtain registration” should not be interpreted
to mean the applicant can unilaterally register a copyright.
Congress was clear and consistent in stating that it is the
Copyright Office, and not the applicant, who “registers” a copyright
claim under § 411(a). Because the Act places the power to “register”
a copyright exclusively on the Copyright Office, as evidenced by
§§ 408(a) and 410(a), registration cannot be “made” under §
411(a) until the Register approves the application. Thus, only the
registration approach is consistent with the plain language of the
statute.
2. The court’s interpretation failed to give effect to every provision and
created an inconsistent statutory scheme
In construing the Act to support the application approach, the
court in Cosmetic Ideas also committed errors by failing to give effect
to every provision of the statute and creating an inconsistent
statutory scheme. Only the registration approach provides a coherent
interpretation of the Act where each provision is operative and terms
have consistent meanings throughout.

88. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (“[T]he Register shall register the claim and issue to the
applicant a certificate . . . .”); id. § 410(b) (“[T]he Register shall refuse registration and shall
notify the applicant in writing of the reasons for such refusal.”).
89. See Fed. Land Bank of Springfield v. Hansen, 113 F.2d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1940).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (“[T]he Register shall register the claim . . . .”).
91. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 176–77 (1994); see also Ariz. Elec. Power Coop. v. United States, 816 F.2d 1366,
1375 (9th Cir. 1987).
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In construing a statute, a court must strive to “give[] effect to
every clause and word”92—that is, a statute should not be interpreted
to render any word or phrase inoperative.93 In adopting the
application approach, however, the Ninth Circuit ignored the
statute’s clear differentiation between “application” and
“registration.” Furthermore, by holding that a copyright is registered
automatically upon application, the court rendered certain provisions
of the Act inoperative.
These errors are particularly evident in two provisions: §§ 411(a)
and 410(d). In addition to the registration requirement, § 411(a)
provides:
In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee
required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright
Office in proper form and registration has been refused, the
applicant is entitled to institute an action for infringement if notice
thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of
Copyrights.94

As a primary matter, “[b]ecause registration in this subsection is
juxtaposed with the separate act of delivering the necessary
application materials to the Copyright Office,” this language
supports the proposition that mere delivery of an application is
insufficient to register a copyright. 95 In other words, because the
statute makes it clear that application and registration are two
separate events, it follows that registration cannot occur upon
application.96
Furthermore, the application approach causes this provision to
lose meaning in light of the rest of § 411(a). Assuming, arguendo,
that the first clause of § 411(a) grants an applicant the right to
initiate an infringement action upon delivering an application for
copyright registration, it would be unnecessary for the subsequent
clause to grant the same applicant the right to initiate an action for
infringement when his or her application is refused.
92. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 106 (1993) (quoting Moskal v. United States,
498 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1990).
93. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (emphasis added).
95. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2010).
96. See Mays & Assocs. Inc. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362, 368 (D. Md. 2005) (“In
fact, the term application is used in the same section [as the term registration] and is clearly
something separate and apart from registration.”).

95

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/5/2011 7:48 PM

2011

More importantly, when interpreted according to the application
approach, § 411(a) is unclear and ambiguous. As mentioned above,
§ 411(a) provides that an applicant can bring a claim for
infringement after registration is made or, if registration is refused,
after serving notice on the Register of Copyrights.97 If interpreted
based on the application approach, however, this section is unclear
because it does not adequately address the scenario in which an
applicant has already initiated a copyright infringement action but
registration is subsequently refused. In this scenario, it is too late for
the applicant to serve notice on the Register before instituting the
action, thus leaving the applicant not knowing what to do with
respect to serving notice on the Register.98 Under the registration
approach, though, it is clear that an applicant cannot institute an
infringement action until the Copyright Office acts on the
application by either accepting or rejecting it, thus eliminating any
lack of clarity in the statute.99
The court also committed similar errors in construing § 410(d).
Section 410(d) provides:
The effective date of a copyright registration is the day on which an
application, deposit, and fee, which are later determined by the
Register of Copyrights or by a court of competent jurisdiction to
be acceptable for registration, have all been received in the
Copyright Office.100

In addition to making it clear that registration occurs subsequent
to application, thus further evidencing that the two acts are
distinct,101 this provision loses meaning under the application
approach. If it were true that the Act provided that a copyright is
automatically registered when the materials are delivered to the
Copyright Office, it would not be necessary for the copyright
registration to be “back dated” to the date of application—the date
of the registration would already be the date of delivery. Thus, the

97. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
98. See Brush Creek Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, No. C-02-3491 EDL, 2002 WL
1906620, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2002).
99. Id.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d).
101. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 2010).
(“However, because this back-dating does not occur until after the Copyright Office or a court
has deemed the registration acceptable, the statute could be read to require action by the
Register to effect registration.”).
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most logical interpretation of this provision is that it accounts for the
fact that registration is effected subsequent to delivery of the
application.
The net result of these errors is that the court in Cosmetic Ideas
created a statutory scheme with inconsistent interpretations of the
terms “registration” and “register.” In statutory construction, a term
that appears throughout a statute ought to be given the same
interpretation each time it appears.102 As discussed above, the only
way to interpret “registration” in §§ 408(a) and 410(a) is to
conclude that the Copyright Office “registers” a copyright after
examining and approving the application. By concluding that a
copyright is automatically registered in § 411(a) after mere
application, the court interpreted “registration” differently than
dictated by §§ 408 and 410, thus creating an inconsistent statutory
scheme. Adopting the registration approach, however, aligns the
concept of “registration” throughout the entire Act. Thus, when
read as a whole, the plain language of the statute can support only
the registration approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unlike registering cars or electronic products, registering
copyrights does not occur instantaneously. Accordingly, because the
Copyright Act requires a copyright to be registered before the owner
can bring suit for infringement, the question has arisen as to whether
a copyright is registered for purposes of this registration requirement
when it is acted upon by the Copyright Office or when it is merely
received. In Cosmetic Ideas, the Ninth Circuit resolved this question
by looking beyond the plain language of the Act to determine that
the application approach best fulfilled Congress’s intent and the
overall purpose of the Act. The court, however, erred in this
conclusion. First, the court misinterpreted statutory language clearly
indicating that it is the Copyright Office, not the copyright holder,
that registers a copyright. Second, by adopting the application
approach, it interpreted the Act in a way that failed to give effect to
every statutory provision and created an inconsistent statutory
scheme. Because the plain language of the statute was clear that the
Copyright Office must act on an application before it is registered, it

102. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994).
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was beyond the court’s purview to consider which method best
effectuated Congress’s policy in enacting the statute.
Nathan R. Curtis

 J.D. Candidate, April 2011, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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